This paper uses an unusually rich sample of liquor brands in the U.S. over the period 1994 to 2004 to test substitutability of advertising media. The liquor industry in the U.S. has experienced a substantial increase in case sales and advertising expenditures since the mid-1990s, raising numerous public policy concerns. Moreover, the mix of advertising media used by liquor brands also changed substantially following the industry's decision in 1996 to begin using radio and television media. We find that the advertising media used by liquor firms are highly substitutable, meaning that partial media bans, such as a ban on television advertising, would prove ineffective in reducing liquor case sales.
Introduction
Alcoholic beverages in the United States have a unique and controversial public policy history.
Certainly no other substance has been the direct target of two constitutional amendments (the Eighteenth and Twenty-first). While moderate use of alcohol is harmless for many, large numbers of Americans suffer from serious alcohol and alcohol related problems.
1 The National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) reports that nearly 14 million Americans abuse alcohol or are alcoholics (NIAAA, 2001) . Moreover, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that of the 42,636 traffic fatalities in 2004, 16,694 (or 39%) were alcohol-related (NHTSA, 2005) . Long-term health problems resulting from heavy alcohol use are well known. More than 2 million Americans, for example, suffer from alcohol-related liver disease (NIAAA, 2002) . The billion per year (NIAAA, 2001 ).
Until the mid-1990s, liquor sales in the U.S. had been waning for a quarter century. 2 As Figure 1 shows, nine-liter case sales of liquor in the U.S. fell from 190.9 thousand in 1980, to a low of 137.3 thousand in 1995. Moreover, liquor's share of the alcoholic beverage industry fell from 44% in 1970 44% in , to 29% in 1995 44% in (Hemphill, 2002 . The industry's outlook in 1995 was bleak. Jobson's Liquor
Handbook (1995) stated frankly, "The outlook is grim, with distilled spirits projected to decline at a rate of 2.1% over the next five years. By the end of the century, total distilled spirits consumption is estimated to drop an additional 14 million cases" (p. 6). Surprisingly, liquor sales began to increase [ Figure 1 about here]
The long-running downward trend in liquor advertising also came to a halt in the mid-1990s (see Figure 1 ), culminating in the 1996 removal of advertising restrictions that stood for over a halfcentury. In December of 1933, ten months after ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, liquor firms voluntarily agreed to not advertise on radio. 3 The agreement was extended in 1948 to include the new medium of television. In June of 1996, however, Seagram broke with the longstanding agreement by airing a commercial for its brand Crown Royal on a local NBC station in Texas (in Figure 1 , the vertical reference line denotes the date of this decision by Seagram) . 4 Despite a large public outcry over the airing, the rest of the liquor industry followed suit by formally agreeing to lift its ban on radio and television advertising in November of 1996. The decision was agreed upon unanimously through the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS), the liquor industry's national trade organization and lobbying group.
Both decisions generated widespread public criticism. President Clinton, for example, publicly derided the actions of liquor firms on several occasions. 5 Representative Joseph Kennedy even introduced legislation to turn the voluntary ban into law. 6 Despite these efforts, industry expenditures on radio and television advertising increased rapidly in the years after 1996. Total radio advertising expenditures increased from $3.2 million in 1996, to $14. This paper is the first to examine liquor advertising since the advertising upturn of the mid-1990s.
Prior advertising research has tended to focus on alcohol in general (see Nelson 2003 , Saffer and Dave 2002 , Nelson and Young 2001 , and Saffer 1997 , or more narrowly, on the beer industry (see Seldon, Jewell, and O'Brien 2000, and Lee and Tremblay 1992) . 8 Within the former, one area of concern has been the efficacy of advertising bans in reducing alcohol consumption. Saffer and Dave (2002) , using a cross-national panel, find that advertising bans decrease total alcohol consumption, though this result appears sensitive to the model specification. 9 Nelson and Young (2001) and Nelson (2003) , by contrast, use cross-state panels to show that total alcohol consumption is largely unaffected by bans and other forms of advertising restrictions.
Other earlier empirical work evaluates the effectiveness of alcohol advertising bans in reducing traffic fatalities. Saffer (1997) finds that a ban on broadcast alcohol advertising (television, radio, and outdoor billboards) would reduce traffic fatalities in the U.S. by as much as 5,000 to 10,000 per year. Saffer (1991) similarly finds that a broadcast ban on beer and wine advertising would reduce fatalities in the U.S. by 10,000 per year. These projections assume no media substitution, however.
If firms responded to a partial ban on broadcast media by increasing their use of non-broadcast media, fatality reductions would likely be diminished.
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There is also a large and growing literature examining the impact of beer advertising on the behavior of beer firms. Most notably, Seldon, Jewell, and O'Brien (2000) utilize a translog cost analysis to find a high degree of substitutability between the print, television, and radio advertising of beer firms. As a result, they argue that partial media bans would have little to no effect on overall beer consumption. Separately, Lee and Tremblay (1992) find that advertising of beer firms has little effect on total market demand. Nelson (2005) provides a useful survey of this literature.
For several reasons, however, beer firms are poor analytical substitutes for liquor firms. As noted above, after prohibition liquor firms refrained from using television or radio media until the year 1996. Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) note, however, that television became an important advertising medium for beer firms during the period 1950 to 1964 (p. 52). Advertising also appears to be more intense among liquor firms. As a percent of sales, advertising in the liquor industry is nearly double that of the beer industry. Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) , for example, show that advertising as a percent of sales in 2000 was 15.2% in the liquor industry, but only 8.6% in the beer industry (p. 171). The beer industry is also considerably more concentrated than the liquor industry.
In 2003, the four-firm concentration ratio ( )
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CR was 98% in the beer industry (see Tremblay et. al. 2005 ), but only 50% in the liquor industry (Adams Media, 2004) . Lastly, beer case sales peaked in the early 1980s, and have trended downwards thereafter (see Nelson 2005, Tremblay and Tremblay 2005) . Liquor case sales, by contrast, declined for a quarter century until 1996, and are currently in a period of increase (see Figure 1) .
In this paper, we construct an unusually rich sample of 74 leading liquor brands over the period 1994 to 2004. This sample is then used to evaluate the potential efficacy of partial advertising media restrictions through the construction of three different advertising media elasticities of substitution:
the one-factor-one-price derived-demand elasticity of substitution, the two-factor-one-price
Morishima elasticity of substitution, and the little used, but appropriate, two-factor-two-price shadow elasticity of substitution. The effectiveness of partial media advertising bans (e.g. a ban on the use of television advertising), depends on the absence of substitutable advertising media. We find that many of the advertising media used by liquor brands are highly substitutable, implying that partial media bans would prove ineffective.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data and the translog cost system estimation, including concerns over autocorrelation and functional form.
Section 3 examines the substitutability of the advertising media used in the liquor industry. Section 4 offers a brief set of conclusions.
Data and Translog Cost Estimation
We collect annual advertising and case sales data for 74 leading liquor brands over the period 1994 to 2004. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1 . The Data Appendix provides further detail on the construction of the data set. Six of the liquor brands in the sample are new brands, introduced after the year 1994. For this reason, the full sample is unbalanced, and consists of 777 observations. In the translog cost analysis, the first year for each brand is used only as a lagged value for the second year, causing the usable sample size to decrease to 703 observations. When the sample is limited to only brands that advertised during a given year, the number of observations falls by an additional 121, to the final data set size of 580 observations (see the estimation sample mean column in Table 1 ). Averaged over the sample period, our sample represents 58.9% of total industry case sales, and 77.7% of total advertising expenditures in the industry.
[ [ Figure 3 about here]
The Translog Cost System
Advertising cost, a, may be expressed as the product of the quantity of advertising messages ( ) A q and the price of those advertising messages ( ) A P . Given that a firm wishes to sell q units of a brand, we assume there are several advertising media available for the firm to advertise in (i.e. print, outdoor, television, and radio). Thus the advertising cost minimization problem can be stated as such that ,
where is a row vector of advertising messages in the various media, is a column vector of the prices for messages in the various media, q is the output that the firm wishes to sell, and
is a quasiconcave twice differentiable advertising function that relates the number of advertising messages to the output the firm wishes to sell. The nature of this advertising function assumes advertising has a diminishing impact, a widely recognized property (see for example, Kadiyali 1996) . 11 In general, our approach follows Seldon, Jewell, and O'Brien (2000) in assuming that the production and advertising cost functions are separable, though we will later test this assumption with a homotheticity test.
In markets with rival brands, the advertising function can be written more completely as
, where A is the total advertising expenditures of rival brands, and Q is the total cases sold by rival brands. A rival in this context is defined as other liquor brands within a liquor segment.
We divide the liquor industry into eight liquor segments: brandy and cognac, cordials and liqueur, gin, prepared cocktails, rum, tequila, vodka, and whiskey. The inclusion of rival's advertising and case sales provides a more complete construction of the advertising cost function, and is a unique feature from prior translog advertising cost estimations (see for example, Silk et. al. 2002 , Seldon et. al. 2000 , and Seldon and Jung 1993 .
The minimization problem results in the advertising cost function,
To evaluate this function, we employ a translog (transcendental logarithmic) representation of a cost function. The translog form is derived via a second-order Taylor's series expansion in logarithms of a cost function of arbitrary form. 12 It is widely noted for its flexibility of form, which for example, is a priori nonhomothetic. Since we are interested in input substitution elasticities, its high generality is useful because it allows the cross-price elasticities to vary along with advertising prices and expenditure shares. This is not true with the common log-log demand model. Suppressing time and brand subscripts, the translog advertising cost model is
where i, j are the four advertising media (outdoor, print, radio, and television), μ are firm dummies, τ are time dummies, and ν is the error term.
The optimal cost-minimizing share equations are found by employing Shephard's Lemma and differentiating (1) with respect to the natural log of the advertising prices: By nature of their construction, the four share equations will sum to unity and result in a singular covariance matrix. To avoid this problem, one of the four share equations must be dropped. We arbitrarily dropped the outdoor advertising share equation, but can recover its parameter estimates using the restrictions defined in (3).
We assume that brand case sales (q) are endogenous, and estimate the system via iterative three stage least squares (I3SLS). Case sales are instrumented with real disposable income per capita and the legal drinking age population.
Autocorrelation
In the initial estimation of the system, evidence of autocorrelation was found in all four of the equations. 13 Berndt and Savin (1975) find that the singularity of the equation system implies that the contemporary disturbance covariance matrix will also be singular. Including all equations from an -equation system, the first-order autoregressive n 1 × n vector of disturbances can be defined as
where ρ is an matrix of unknown autoregressive parameters, and is a vector of wellbehaved i.i.d. error terms. It is useful to partition the ρ matrix into a where o denotes outdoor, p denotes the print share equation, r denotes radio, and t denotes television. Berndt and Savin (1975) show that the columns in the submatrix will sum to the same unknown constant. However, can be transformed by differencing each element from the autocorrelation coefficient of the media share that will be dropped (in our case, 
The translog system of equations defined by the cost equation (1) and share equations (2) may then be estimated simultaneously with the autocorrelation parameters given in (4). 14
Functional Form and Estimation
The translog functional form imposes minimal structure a priori. Post-estimation, however, we test three restrictions of the functional form: homotheticity, homogeneity, and constant returns to Each of these restrictions may be tested using the likelihood ratio statistic. While the likelihood ratio statistic for homotheticity is an insignificant 5.75, (p-value = 0.124), the other test statistics are statistically significant at the 5% level. 15 Hence, the homothetic model is appropriate for the sample period.
The translog cost equation (1) (test statistic = 9.62, p-value = 0.382). The firm dummy variables are therefore included in the translog estimation, and the year dummies are dropped. Table 2 provides the I3SLS parameter estimates for the translog system defined by equations (1) and (2), and subject to restrictions given in (3). In the estimation the output share equation is omitted, and the error term follows the AR(1) form defined in (4). [ Table 2 about here]
Advertising Media Elasticities of Substitution
The principle of substitutability suggests that firms banned from using one advertising medium could maintain a constant level of output by increasing their use of a second advertising medium, if the second medium is substitutable for the first. Hence, the effectiveness of a partial advertising media ban depends on the absence of substitutable media. Our sample is well suited for accessing advertising substitutability since the considerable changes in case sales and advertising practices over the sample period (see Figures 1 and 2 ) will enable proper identification of the underlining effects.
To assess media substitutability from a many-input cost function, several alternative unit free measures can be constructed. Chambers (1988) organizes these alternatives into three useful categories: one-factor-one-price elasticities of substitution (OOES), two-factor-one-price elasticities of substitution (TOES), and two-factor-two-price elasticities of substitution (TTES). We are interested in measures from each of the three categories of substitutability. 18
The derived-demand price elasticity of substitution and the Allen elasticity of substitution are OOES. Following Chambers (1988) , the cross-price and own-price derived-demand elasticities are defined as Table 2 . These elasticities are classified as OOES because they portray the percent change in the use of one advertising medium from a one percent change in the price of one other advertising medium. Inputs i and j are denoted derived-demand substitutes if , and derived-demand complements if .
The related Allen elasticity of substitution was constructed originally by Allen (1938) and Uzawa (1962) . Following Chambers (1988) and Blackorby and Russell (1989) , the Allen elasticity can be expressed as Notice that the Allen elasticity provides little new information beyond the derived-demand elasticity.
Dividing the price elasticity by the cost share removes the asymmetric information of the elasticity (because ). Although Allen elasticities were the principal elasticity of substitution reported in early empirical work (see for example, Green 1976, and Brendt and Wood 1975) , they have since been significantly criticized as uninformative by Blackorby and Russell (1989) and Chambers (1988) . We follow these criticisms and only report the derived-demand elasticities, though the Allen elasticities may be easily recovered from equation (6).
The Morishima elasticity of substitution is a TOES. Originated by Morishima (1967) , the Morishima elasticity measures the percent change in the media input ratio from a one percent change in the price of an input:
This can be shown to be equivalent to (see Chambers 1988, Blackorby and Russell 1989) 
. Notice that the shadow elasticities are symmetric, . Although shadow elasticities have not been used in prior empirical work, they are, nevertheless, appropriate. As Chambers (1988) shows, the shadow elasticities are closest in concept to Hicks' two-factor elasticity of substitution (p. 99).
S ji S ij σ σ =
The estimated derived-demand price elasticities of substitution are presented in Table 3 . Panel A in Table 3 presents the elasticities measured at the sample mean, as is common in the literature.
From Figure 2 , however, it is clear that the mix of advertising media used at the end of the sample is different from the advertising mix used at the beginning. Therefore, Panel B in Table 3 presents the elasticities measured at the final year of the sample, a period more reflective of current advertising usage. The estimated derived-demand own-price elasticities are shown along the main diagonal. complements. Overall, the elasticities in Panels A and B are quite similar, with the notable exception of television share of advertising (i.e. when i = television). In these four cases, the elasticities measured at the sample mean are three to five times larger in absolute value than the elasticities measured for the year 2004. This difference is due largely to the limited use of television advertising before the year 2000, which appears to have had a distorting impact on the television elasticities measured at the sample mean.
[ Table 3 about here]
The Morishima elasticities are presented in Table 4 . In general, most of the media in Table 4 [ Table 4 about here]
Unlike the OOES derived-demand elasticities reported in Table 3 , Morishima elasticities measure the relative input change from a single factor price change. To illustrate, notice that an increase in the price of television leads to a modest but statistically significant increase in the share of print advertising (from Table 3 Table 4 indicate that an increase in the price of television leads to a large and statistically significant increase in the share of print-to-television advertising, [ Table 5 about Table   5 further evaluate the impact of television price changes by considering the adjustment in the media input ratio from a change in the media price ratio. Under this derivation, print and outdoor media are again found to be substitutes for television advertising ( Table 5 ).
The efficacy of a ban on radio advertising, however, is less clear. From Table 3 , an increase in the price of radio is found to decrease the use of outdoor advertising media, indicating they are derived-demand complements (
and −2.129 in Panels A and B of Table 3 ). 21 Silk, Klien, and Brendt (2002) find a similar relationship among national U.S. advertisers over the period 1960-1994. 22 When one also considers the effect of a radio price increase on its own-price elasticity demand, however, the relationship disappears ( Table   4 ). When changes in the media price ratio are taken into account, the shadow outdoor and radio elasticity is negatively signed, but not statistically significant ( Table 5 ). The impact of a radio price increase on the remaining two media, print and television, is not found to be statistically different from zero with any of the three elasticities of substitution.
Conclusion
This paper has presented empirical evidence on the substitutability of the advertising media used by liquor brands in the United States. The liquor industry in the U.S. has experienced a substantial turnaround since the mid-1990s. Between 1995 and 2004, liquor case sales increased by 21%, and liquor advertising increased by 64%. Moreover, the mix of advertising media used by liquor brands also changed substantially following the industry's decision in 1996 to break a long-standing ban against the use of radio and television media. Increases in liquor sales raise numerous public policy concerns, however, particularly given the high costs to society emanating from alcoholism, alcoholrelated traffic fatalities, and other alcohol-related health problems. Despite the importance of these concerns, this study is apparently the first to empirically evaluate the liquor industry since these changes began in the mid-1990s.
Using a rich sample of 74 leading liquor brands over the period 1994 to 2004, we discover through a translog cost estimation that the advertising media used by liquor brands are highly substitutable. This finding implies that the imposition of a partial media advertising ban would prove ineffective in reducing consumption. Twice over our sample period, bills have been introduced into the House of Representatives that would prohibit the use of television media for liquor advertising (H.R. 3644 in 1996, and H.R. 1067 in 1997). If such legislation were passed, our findings indicate that liquor brands could maintain case sales by increasing their utilization of print and outdoor media.
The government, in effect, would be resolving the prisoner's dilemma for these firms by enforcing a cooperative solution of no-television advertising.
Many additional issues remain open for further investigation. Given the remarkable turnaround in liquor sales pictured in Figure 1 , a thorough analysis on the determinants of liquor demand would be useful in furthering our findings. Moreover, some of the concern surrounding liquor advertising on television and radio relates specifically to the potential for these media to uniquely influence and inform young adults. 23 While our results suggest that among consumers as a whole, the medium of television is substitutable for outdoor and print media, we lack the data to specifically evaluate its substitutability among young adults. Recent evidence on tobacco use by Goel and Nelson (2005) , for example, indicates that responses to tobacco usage policies differ significantly between age cohorts.
Our analysis also leaves aside the possibility of beverage-substitution. Nelson (2003) has shown that restrictive laws directed at only one form of alcohol (liquor, wine, or beer), may simply result in substitution to the other two forms. These are all important areas for future research to consider. 7 As a result of this agreement, the first network TV liquor ad in U.S. history aired on December 15th of that year on the NBC late night program "Saturday Night Live". As part of the contract, Diageo agreed to nineteen specific guidelines intended to limit children and teenagers' exposure to liquor commercials. 8 The literature on cigarette advertising may also be of interest here. Exploiting cross-national variations in the advertising media available to cigarette firms, Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) find that partial advertising media bans have little or no effect on consumption. Comprehensive advertising bans, however, are found to be effective in reducing tobacco consumption.
9 In Saffer (2002) , advertising bans are converted to a discrete count variable. When country dummies are included in the equations, the advertising ban variable becomes insignificant. When the dummies are absent, however, the ban variable is significant at the 10 percent level.
10 Saffer (1997) recognizes this point, "if a ban on broadcast advertising resulted in a complete substitution to other media and no reduction in the marginal product of advertising in other media, than the ban would have no effect at all" (p. 441).
11 Leone (1995) analyses several empirical studies on the duration of advertising effects, and concludes that a 90 percent duration interval of six to nine months is typical.
12 For the original derivation see Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1971) . For a more recent interpretation, see Berndt (1991) Media Reporting, 1994 -2004 . This publication tracks total advertising expenditures, as well as expenditures within ten separate national media: magazines, Sunday magazines, newspapers, outdoor, network TV, spot TV, syndicated TV, cable TV, network radio, and spot radio.
Case sales and advertising expenditures are deflated using the producer price index for distilleries, 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 year... Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Subscripts: q = own case sales, p = print, r = radio, t = television, A = total advertising expenditures by rival brands, and Q = total case sales by rival brands. Outdoor is the omitted share equation, Allied Domecq is the omitted firm dummy. The estimated autocorrelation parameters are not reported, but available upon request from the author. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Brown-Forman (Grand Metropolitan, -1995) 291.6 2,210.3
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